移轉訂價、逃漏稅責任分攤、內部控制與租稅協調

Transfer Pricing, Tax Evasion Responsibility Sharing, Internal Control, and Tax Harmonization

本文探討多國籍企業在面對子公司經理人隱匿公司所得的行為，以及其需要分攤逃漏稅法律責任的情況下，應該如何制訂移轉訂價與工資契約以達到內部控制的目的。依據我們的研究指出，由內部控制的角度來看，相較於子公司經理人無隱匿公司所得而言，多國籍企業應訂定較高的移轉訂價、降低給予子公司經理人的分紅比例，而當子公司經理人的分紅利益與逃漏稅利益，大於（小於）子公司經理人無隱匿公司所得行為下的分紅利益時，則定額給付的數額較高（較低）。再者，當子公司經理人逃漏稅法律承擔責任比例提高（降低），多國籍企業會提高（降低）分紅比例，移轉訂價的方向則未定。最後，兩國政府租稅政策於Nash均衡時，本國政府制訂的稅率會對外國福利水準造成負的財政外部性，而外國政府制訂的稅率對本國福利水準則不一定會造成負的財政外部性。換言之，當兩國政府從事租稅協調（tax harmonization）時，本國政府的稅率會降低，至於外國政府稅率的調整方向則不一定。

This research investigates how multinational enterprises (MNEs) can devise transfer pricing and wage contracts for internal control purposes in the face of the concealment of corporate income by a subsidiary manager and the need to share responsibility for tax evasion. According to our findings, first, from an internal control perspective, MNEs should set higher transfer pricing and lower bonus ratios for the subsidiary manager compared to the subsidiary manager who did not conceal corporate income. Second, if the profit sharing and tax evasion benefits of the subsidiary manager are greater (less) than the profit-sharing benefits of the subsidiary manager who does not conceal corporate income, then MNEs can charge a higher (lower) amount of the lump-sum transfer. Third, if the percentage of liability for tax evasion by the subsidiary manager increases (decreases), then MNEs can increase (decrease) the bonus ratios when the direction of transfer pricing is undetermined. Finally, the consequence of tax harmonization between home and host countries indicates that the tax rate of the home country should be reduced, but the tax rate of the host country remains uncertain.