| 英文摘要 |
Does colonialism involve an inherent moral wrong? Or, put differently, why is colonialism unjust? This question has become one of the most vigorously debated issues in contemporary political philosophy. The debate is significant because it shapes how we understand the possibility of decolonisation and informs our judgements about the justice of political communities. In this paper, I examine three leading accounts of the injustice of colonialism and evaluate them from the perspective of settler colonialism studies. The three positions under consideration are: (1) Lia Ypi’s theory of political domination, which argues that the fundamental wrong of colonisation lies in the imposition of an unequal and non-reciprocal political order; (2) Laura Valentini’s theory of bad governance, which maintains that colonialism has no intrinsic moral wrong and that the harms associated with it are merely the result of defective governance; and (3) Margaret Moore’s theory of territorial appropriation, which contends that the central wrong of colonialism consists in the wrongful occupation of Indigenous lands. Ypi challenges traditional theories of territorial rights and nationalism as adequate explanations of colonial injustice, while Valentini and Moore, in turn, criticise Ypi’s account of political domination. Settler colonialism studies emphasise that settler colonialism differs from traditional colonialism in its commitment to what has been described as the‘logic of elimination’. Whereas traditional colonialism often preserves a structural distinction between coloniser and colonised, settler colonialism aims at the erasure of Indigenous peoples as distinct political communities. Consequently, the most successful settler colonial societies efface divisions between coloniser and colonised: settlers no longer perceive themselves as outsiders but instead as natives. This paper argues that Ypi offers the most compelling account of the injustice of colonialism and that the criticisms advanced by Valentini and Moore are not fully persuasive. However, perhaps paradoxically, Ypi’s theory of political domination also illuminates how settler colonialism can deny Indigenous sovereignty through the establishment of an equal and reciprocal constitutional order. In this sense, a formally egalitarian political structure may still constitute a successful settler colonial society. Decolonisation, therefore, does not necessarily entail de-settler-colonisation. Rather, de-settler-colonisation requires a political and theoretical framework capable of restoring Indigenous sovereignty and reckoning with the historical experience of its dispossession. |