合憲性審查中立法事實概念的反思與重構

我國通說將合憲性審查中的立法事實理解為''支撐立法目的正當性與手段妥當性的事實''。這種理解不同於立法事實概念提出時的原初含義，且有必要予以反思。一方面，合憲性審查能夠發揮法的創設這一準立法功能，這體現在審查主體需要從高度原則性和抽象性的憲法規範中發展出具體的規範性命題，以及合憲性審查中的憲法判斷往往具有超越個案、形成或改變法秩序的效果；另一方面，即便與立法目的正當性與手段妥當性無涉的憲法判斷也時常需要有事實基礎。因此，合憲性審查中的立法事實應當被理解為''支撐合憲性審查中法的創設的事實''，包含憲法法理事實、憲法審查事實以及用作立法事實的個案事實三種類型。重構立法事實概念體系的實踐意義有二：其一，在合憲性審查工作中，應當妥善考慮事實歸類對於合憲性推定原則的適用以及對於字面違憲與適用違憲之區分的影響；其二，應當設置有助於探知客觀事實的程序機制，並針對不同的事實類型採用不同的證據真實性標準。

The prevailing view in China defines legislative facts in constitutional review as“facts supporting the legitimacy of legislative purposes and the appropriateness of means.”This interpretation diverges from the original meaning of the concept and warrants critical reflection. On one hand, constitutional review performs a quasi-legislative function of law creation, reflected in the reviewer’s need to derive specific normative propositions from highly principled and abstract constitutional provisions, and the fact that constitutional judgments often transcend individual cases to shape or alter the legal order. On the other hand, constitutional judgments unrelated to the legitimacy of legislative purposes or the appropriateness of means frequently require a factual basis as well. Therefore, legislative facts in constitutional review should be understood as“facts supporting law creation within constitutional review,”encompassing three categories: constitutional doctrinal facts, constitutional reviewable facts, and case-specific facts serving as legislative facts. This reconstructed conceptual system holds two practical implications: first, in constitutional review practice, the classification of facts must be carefully considered for its impact on the application of the presumption of constitutionality and the distinction between facial unconstitutionality and as-applied unconstitutionality; second, procedural mechanisms should be established to facilitate the discovery of objective facts, with distinct evidentiary standards applied to different categories of facts.