灰色地帶戰略下海底電纜保護：美國立法回應與我國法制建議

Protecting Subsea Cables under Gray-Zone Strategies: U.S. Legislative Responses and Legal Recommendations for Taiwan

海底電纜為全球資訊傳輸之核心基礎設施，亦逐漸成為灰色地帶戰略下之關鍵攻防標的。近年多起海底電纜毀損事件顯示，行為態樣多具可否認性、低強度與法律責任難以歸屬等特性，使傳統以故意犯為中心之刑事規範面臨適用困境。本文以比較法方法，分析美國既有法制、2025年由美國國會所提之法案與我國電信管理法第72條之規範架構，並檢討其在灰色地帶戰略脈絡下之制度回應能力。
本文指出，美國現行法規範雖具歷史意義，但刑度偏低、規範結構簡略，難以充分因應當代國家支持型破壞行為；然近年提出之Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026與Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act，則已將海底電纜安全提升至國家戰略層級，強調跨機關協調、制裁工具與供應鏈韌性。相較之下，我國透過修正電信管理法強化刑責與沒收制度，已補強保護客體與財產制裁面向，然在域外管轄、責任推定機制、主觀意圖證明困難及戰略整合層次上，仍存在制度缺口。
本文進一步主張，單純加重刑罰不足以回應灰色地帶戰略行動之結構特性，應透過三項制度調整以強化規範實效：其一，應建立嚴格責任推定機制，以克服海上蒐證困難；其二，適度擴張保護原則之適用範圍，強化對領海外破壞行為之刑事管轄；其三，將海底電纜安全納入國安層級之常態監測與跨機關整合架構。
總結而言，海底電纜保護法制之發展，應由「事後刑罰」思維轉向「整體韌性治理」模式，結合刑事制裁、行政監理與戰略層級協調，以提升國家在灰色地帶戰略環境下之基礎設施安全與法律嚇阻效能。

Subsea cables serve as the backbone of global information transmission and have increasingly become focal points of confrontation within gray-zone strategies. Recent incidents of cable damage demonstrate characteristics such as deniability, low intensity, and legal ambiguity, posing significant challenges to traditional criminal frameworks centered on specific intent. Employing a comparative legal methodology, this article analyzes the existing U.S. legal framework, the legislative proposals introduced by the U.S. Congress in 2025–2026, and the regulatory structure of Article 72 of Taiwan’s Telecommunications Management Act, evaluating their responsive capacities within the context of gray-zone maneuvers.
The study indicates that while existing U.S. statutes possess historical significance, their lenient sentencing and simplified structures are inadequate for deterring contemporary state-sponsored sabotage. Conversely, the recently proposed Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026 and the Taiwan Undersea Cable Resilience Initiative Act have elevated cable security to the level of national strategy, emphasizing inter-agency coordination, sanction mechanisms, and supply chain resi lience. In comparison, Taiwan has strengthened criminal penalties and forfeiture systems through amendments to the Telecommunications Management Act. However, institutional gaps remain regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, mechanisms for the presumption of liability, the evidentiary difficulty of proving subjective intent, and high-level strategic integration.
This article further asserts that merely increasing statutory penalties is insufficient to counter the structural characteristics of gray-zone actions. To enhance regulatory effectiveness, three institutional adjustments are proposed: 1. Evidentiary Reform: Introducing limited presumptions of liability or shifts in the burden of proof to overcome the inherent difficulties of maritime evidence collection. 2. Jurisdictional Expansion: Moderately extending the application of the“protective principle”to strengthen criminal jurisdiction over sabotage occurring beyond territorial waters. 3. Governance Integration: Incorporating subsea cable security into a national security-level framework for continuous monitoring and inter-agency synergy.
In conclusion, the evolution of legal regimes for subsea cable protection must shift from a“post-hoc punishment”mindset toward an“integrated resilience governance”model. By combining criminal sanctions, administrative oversight, and strategic coordination, a state can enhance its infrastructure security and legal deterrence efficacy within a gray-zone environment.