從國際法論海底電纜之保護：法律困境與可能因應

The Protection of Submarine Cables under International Law: Legal Limits and Possible Responses

本文試圖從國際法視角，系統性探討海底電纜的保護困境，並針對我國的具體處境提出建議。本文認為，現代社會高度依賴海底電纜傳遞網際網路資訊，而近年歐洲波羅的海、北海及臺灣周邊海域相繼發生海底電纜損壞事件，涉嫌船舶多為中國籍或中資權宜船，讓外界難以排除「灰區作戰」的蓄意破壞可能性。本文檢視現行國際法規範，從1884年「海底電纜保護公約」到1982年「聯合國海洋法公約」，然而依目前國際法，沿海國僅在領海內享有完整執法管轄權。一旦破壞行為發生在專屬經濟區、大陸架或公海，執行管轄權原則上屬於船旗國，而非受害沿海國，形成重大執法漏洞。因此本文評估多種補強方案：援引必要性原則、將破壞行為比照海盜罪賦予普遍管轄權、適用「推定存在主義」、修改「聯合國海洋法公約」、制定新專門公約、或透過聯合國安理會授權決議—但逐一指出各方案在法理上或政治上的重大困難，尤其是中俄兩國的阻撓使聯合國安理會決議或修約機制幾乎不具可行性。而檢視國際實踐，在現行法框架下，部分國家已建立海底電纜保護區（如丹麥、澳洲、紐西蘭）或推動北約「波羅的海哨兵」任務，以強化監控與嚇阻能力，惟澳洲模式被譽為「世界最佳實踐」，仍僅能對本國人民課以刑事責任。
最後，本文建議我國應善用領海內完整執法權，強化相關海域巡邏，並在符合國際法的條件下，針對涉嫌船舶積極行使登臨檢查。對於在領海外的涉嫌破壞行為，可考量在有充分理由時援引「必要性原則」進行登臨檢查。長期而言，應積極參與區域合作、建立資訊共享機制，並倡議將蓄意破壞海底電纜納入普遍管轄權範疇，以維護國家通訊安全與國際法秩序。

This article systematically examines the challenges of protecting submarine cables from an international law perspective, while offering recommendations tailored to Taiwan's specific circumstances. It is well established that modern society is heavily dependent on submarine cables for transmitting internet data. In recent years, a series of cable damage incidents have occurred in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the waters surrounding Taiwan, with the suspected vessels frequently identified as Chinese—flagged ships or vessels under Chinese beneficial ownership—making it difficult to rule out the possibility of deliberate sabotage as part of“grey zone warfare”.
Against this backdrop, the article examines the existing international legal framework governing submarine cable protection, from the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under current international law, however, coastal States enjoy full enforcement jurisdiction only within their territorial seas. Once a damaging act occurs in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), on the continental shelf, or on the high seas, enforcement jurisdiction belongs in principle to the flag State rather than the affected coastal State—creating a significant enforcement gap.
The article then evaluates several proposed remedies: invoking the doctrine of necessity, assimilating cable sabotage to piracy so as to claim universal jurisdiction, applying the doctrine of constructive presence, amending UNCLOS, negotiating a new specialized convention, or seeking authorization through a UN Security Council resolution. Each option is examined and found to face substantial legal or political obstacles; in particular, opposition from China and Russia renders Security Council authorization or treaty amendment mechanisms virtually unworkable.
Turning to State practice, the article surveys measures adopted within the existing legal framework, including the establishment of submarine cable protection zones by Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as NATO's“Baltic Sentry”mission, all aimed at strengthening surveillance and deterrence. Notably, even the Australian model—widely regarded as world best practice—is limited to imposing criminal liability on its own nationals.
Finally, the article recommends that Taiwan make full use of its enforcement jurisdiction within the territorial sea, strengthen patrols in relevant maritime zones, and proactively exercise the right of visit against suspect vessels in a manner consistent with international law. Where there are sufficient grounds, Taiwan should also consider invoking the doctrine of necessity to justify boarding vessels suspected of causing damage beyond the territorial sea. In the longer term, Taiwan should actively engage in regional cooperation, establish information—sharing mechanisms, and advocate for treating deliberate submarine cable sabotage as a matter subject to universal jurisdiction—thereby safeguarding national communications security and upholding the international legal order.