中國反壟斷實施機制的檢討與完善

競爭損害由福利轉移損失和社會福利淨損失組成，理想的反壟斷實施機制應由私人實施救濟福利轉移損失，公共實施救濟社會福利淨損失，但公私實施機制疊加產生的高昂成本，促使各司法轄區均發展出主輔搭配的實施機制。中國以公共實施為主和私人實施為輔的實施機制，存在橫向協議發現率低以及整體威懾力弱、補償率低的局限。理論界寄予厚望的民事公益訴訟因較高的信息成本、錯誤成本和運行成本而無法解決前述局限，圍繞私人實施提出的各種主流變革方案，也因忽略中國本土運行環境而效果欠佳。理性的做法是接受公共實施為主和私人實施為輔的現實妥協，將私人實施定位在重大的私益損害救濟、未被公共實施救濟的私益損害救濟，以及壟斷協議參與者的私益損害救濟等空白場域。公共實施則同時肩負起更重的威懾和補償任務，前者須將沒收違法所得併入罰款，並構建更加精細化的罰款計算標准，後者須構建起自願補償和公共補償兩種方案。

Competition harm consists of welfare transfer losses and net social welfare losses. An ideal antitrust law enforcement should involve private enforcement for welfare transfer losses and public enforcement for net social welfare losses. However, the high costs resulting from the combination of public and private enforcement have led judicial jurisdictions to develop an enforcement mechanism of primary-auxiliary coordination. The current enforcement mechanism in China, with a focus on public enforcement and private enforcement as a supplement, faces limitations such as low detection rate of horizontal agreements, weak deterrent effect, and low compensation rate. Civil public interest litigation, which the academic community has high hopes for, cannot address the aforementioned limitations due to high information costs, error costs, and operating costs. Various mainstream reform proposals centered around private enforcement have been ineffective due to neglect of the local operating environment in China. A rational approach is to accept the compromise of public enforcement as the main method and private enforcement as a supplement, positioning private enforcement in significant private harm relief, private harm relief not covered by public enforcement, and private harm relief for participants in monopolistic agreements. Public enforcement should bear heavier deterrence and compensation goals, with the former involving confiscation of illegal gains into fines and the establishment of more refined fine calculation standards, and the latter involving the creation of voluntary compensation and public compensation schemes.