How to Justify the‘Morality First’Principle? Lessons from Kant for the Current Overridingness Debate in Metaethics

How to Justify the‘Morality First’Principle? Lessons from Kant for the Current Overridingness Debate in Metaethics

Among Kant’s moral doctrines, the primacy of morality is certainly one of the least celebrated. It implies that whenever a moral demand clashes with some non-moral demand(s), the moral demand must take precedence. Many scholars in modern metaethics hold that such a‘Morality First’Principle (MFP) is neither desirable nor justifiable. My intention is to reflect critically on the latter claim by reviewing three possible Kantian justifications: the semantic justification implying that moral demands are by definition overriding, the rational justification according to which moral demands are rationally superior, and the value justification stating that moral demands protect a more important value, namely the value of humanity. I argue that while the first two options cannot validate the MFP, the third option is an overlooked, lucid Kantian justification which can even make some sense of MFP’s desirability.