Supererogation within Kant’s Ethics

Supererogation within Kant’s Ethics

We often encounter individuals who not only adhere strictly to their ordinary moral obligations but also go beyond them in ways that are morally commendable and admirable, such as sacrificing their own interests to help others. Such actions, referred to as supererogatory acts, are considered to possess greater moral value than merely fulfilling ordinary obligations. Yet these phenomena present a challenge to Kant’s ethics. According to Kant, the sole source of moral value lies in acting from duty. How, then, can an action that exceeds the requirements of duty be said to possess a higher moral value? This paper examines three interpretive approaches within Kant’s ethics for addressing this issue: (1) denying the moral value of supererogatory acts altogether, characterizing the praise and admiration they evoke in terms of nonmoral values, and (2) locating a justification for the moral value of supererogatory acts within Kant’s concept of imperfect duties, and (3) grounding it in moral character and virtue. The paper defends and further develops the third approach, arguing that situating the moral value of supererogatory acts in character and virtue not only coheres with Kant’s ethics but also provides a more comprehensive and intuitively satisfying account of their ethical significance.