武裝的共生：日治初期臺灣總督府對嘉南沿山地帶「土匪」的歸順政策與地方菁英

Armed Symbiosis: The Government-General, Local Elites, and the Pacification of“Bandits”in the Jianan Foothills

本文以嘉南沿山地帶為對象，重新探討日治初期臺灣總督府針對「土匪」所推行的歸順政策。過去的研究多採「總督府vs.武裝抗日勢力」的二元對立模式，本文則引入「殖民地戰爭」與「軍事化社會」兩個視角，將地方菁英定位為殖民當局與「土匪」之外的第三方歷史行動者納入分析架構。
總督府的「土匪」政策自雲林事件後開始轉變，其所謂「歸順政策」，實際上包含性質不同的兩種手段：一為針對特定匪首、具單次性質的「招降」，一為作為制度性措施、以集體為對象並附帶監督處分機制的「歸順勸誘」。其後在兒玉源太郎與後藤新平上任後，政策重整為區分「日本所製造的土匪」（應「招降」或「歸順勸誘」）與「真正的盜賊」（應討伐）。
本文聚焦於前後大埔、中埔地區黃國鎮、林添丁、阮振等人的「招降」，以及番仔山集團的「歸順勸誘」過程。地方菁英（如林武琛、毛榮生、陳向義）憑藉其武裝實力與親屬人脈，在交涉中扮演核心角色，並積極參與歸順條件的制定。其中，「招降」多以軍隊撤離、承諾設置公局及支付金錢作為交換條件；而「歸順勸誘」則主要透過支付金錢，並配合地方紛爭的調處來促成歸順。兩者皆往往在非公開的交涉中完成。尤其在番仔山案例中，地方菁英甚至運用武力威嚇迫使林其春讓步歸順。
總體而言，總督府所推動的歸順政策，實乃殖民統治尚未全面滲透、殖民地戰爭尚未終結、且社會尚未解除武裝之際，一種具有「休戰」性質的統治技術。此種安排雖促成了殖民當局、地方菁英與「土匪」三方之間特殊的「武裝共生」局面，使「土匪」得以暫時重返地方社會；但同時亦將其置於政治秩序轉型與沿山邊陲空間交織的「閾限性」（liminality）之中。此種閾限狀態不僅使「土匪」的身分懸置於「良」與「匪」之間，亦使地方菁英同樣身處於這一閾限處境之中。

This article reexamines the pacification policies implemented by the Government- General of Taiwan in the early Japanese colonial period, focusing on the Jianan (嘉南) foothills and the role of local elites. Existing scholarship has largely framed this period through a binary opposition between the colonial government and armed anti-Japanese resistance. By contrast, this study adopts the perspectives of colonial war and militarized society, positioning local elites as a third set of historical actors alongside the colonial authorities and the so-called“bandits.”
Following the Yunlin Incident (雲林事件), the Government-General’s policies toward“bandits”(土匪) underwent a significant transformation. What was broadly described as a“pacification policy”in fact comprised two distinct strategies. The first, negotiated surrender (招降), involved ad hoc negotiations targeting specific bandit leaders. The second, induced submission (歸順勸誘), was a more institutionalized policy directed at groups and accompanied by mechanisms of surveillance and disciplinary control. After Kodama Gentarōand GotōShinpei assumed office, these measures were reorganized around a key distinction:“bandits of Japan’s own making”were to be managed through negotiated surrender or induced submission, whereas“genuine criminals,”were to be eliminated through punitive military force.
This article examines negotiated surrenders involving figures such as Huang Guozhen (黃國鎮), Lin Tianding (林添丁), and Ruan Zhen (阮振) in the Qian-Dapu (前大埔), Hou-Dapu (後大埔), and Zhongpu (中埔) areas, as well as the induced submission of the Fanzaishan (番仔山) group. Local elites including Lin Wuchen (林武琛), Mao Rongsheng (毛榮生), and Chen Xiangyi (陳向義) played pivotal roles in these processes. By mobilizing their armed forces and kinship networks, they not only mediated negotiations but actively shaped the terms of surrender. Negotiated surrender typically entailed troop withdrawals, promises to establish local administrative offices (公局), and monetary payments. Induced submission relied primarily on financial compensation combined with the mediation of local disputes. In both cases, negotiations were conducted through nonpublic channels. In the Fanzaishan case, local elites even resorted to armed intimidation to compel Lin Qichun (林其春) to submit.
Overall, this study argues that the Government-General’s surrender policies functioned as a ceasefire-like governing technique at a moment when colonial rule had yet to fully penetrate local society, colonial war remained unresolved, and social disarmament was incomplete. The result was a distinctive form of armed symbiosis among the colonial state, local elites, and“bandits,”enabling the latter to temporarily reenter local society while remaining within a deliberately maintained gray zone of the foothills. Marked by the instability of regime transition and the marginal geography of the foothills, this liminal condition not only left“bandits'' suspended between the categories of“outlaws”(匪) and“law-abiding subjects”(良), but also drew local elites into the same liminal predicament.