| 英文摘要 |
To address the theoretical controversies surrounding Article 201 of the Criminal Procedure Law, a relatively sound approach is to introduce reliance protection theory to reform the so-called“constraint theory”. In cases involving guilty pleas and acceptance of punishment, the accused enters a plea based on reliance on the exercise of state judicial power. The reasonable expectations thereby generated may be characterized as procedural reliance interests. As a form of process-based interest, procedural reliance interests arise from the disposition of procedural rights. They are capable of generating procedural constraints on state judicial power, but remain subject to limitations stemming from public interests, the judge's independent adjudicatory authority, and the discretionary leniency principle underlying guilty plea and punishment acceptance. Article 201 embodies protection of procedural reliance interests. Paragraph 1 concerns the formation of binding force. In its application, the identification of reliance interests should be incorporated: the phrase“generally shall be adopted”should be understood as a declaratory clause, while the proviso should be applied in conjunction with circumstances in which reliance interests are not established or lack protectability. Paragraph 2 concerns the release of binding force. The determination of“manifest impropriety”should be aligned with the discretionary leniency principle, and“adjustment of the sentencing recommendation”should be treated as the default consequence, unless the reliance interest has been voluntarily waived. Improvements to the binding-force provisions should consistently follow a protective logic, with particular attention given to the special safeguards required after the binding force has been lifted. |