污染防治外包下之跨產業環境與產業政策搭配分析

Analysis of Cross-industry Environmental and Industrial Policy Coordination under Pollution Control Outsourcing

本研究在跨產業污染且污染防治外包下，探討政府對於排放稅與生產補貼政策的搭配問題。結果發現：第一，在無環境與產業政策下，污染防治服務的購入價格與提供量均為零。第二，在排放稅政策下，污染排放企業的污染防治購入價格等於排放稅的一半；排放稅率越高，則污染防治購入價格越高。第三，單一排放稅政策下，在受污染行業的市場規模足夠大，政府的排放稅為正。第四，雙政策下，在受污染行業的市場規模足夠大，排放稅與生產補貼也為正。第五，政府實行排放稅或雙政策下，當受污染行業市場規模越大或邊際污染係數越大時，將可能出現採取排放稅的福利水準高於雙政策的情況。

This study explores the combination of government emission taxes and production subsidies under the scenario of cross-industry pollution and outsourcing of pollution control. The results show that: First, in the absence of environmental and industrial policies, the purchase price and supply of pollution control services are both zero. Second, under an emission tax policy, the purchase price of pollution control services for polluting enterprises is equal to half the emission tax; the higher the emission tax rate, the higher the purchase price. Third, under a single emission tax policy, the government's emission tax is positive if the market size of the polluted industry is large enough. Fourth, under a dual policy policy, the emission tax and production subsidies are also positive if the market size of the polluted industry is large enough. Fifth, when the government implements either an emission tax or a dual policy, the welfare level of an emission tax is likely to be higher than that of a dual policy when the market size of the polluted industry is larger or the marginal pollution coefficient is higher.