混合雙佔下環境消費意識與環境稅

Environmental Consumer Awareness and Environmental Policy in Mixed Duopoly

本文建立在公民營混合寡占、生產技術差異設計下，環境消費意識對環境政策的決定與影響，探討環境消費意識如何影響廠商污染防治行為、影響社會最適環境稅率、以及消費者剩餘與社會福利的變化。若消費者不存在環境消費意識時，所有廠商會進行不完全污染防治，最適環境稅不為零，在消費者完全環境消費意識下，公營廠商將出現虧損，民營廠商仍有獲利，此時所有廠商會進行完全污染防治，環境沒有出現汙染外溢，政府的最適環境稅率為零。

This paper is based on the design of a mixed oligopoly, exploring the determination and impact of environmental policy on environmental consumer awareness, and investigating how environmental consumer awareness influences firms' pollution abatement behavior, affects the socially optimal environmental tax rate, and changes consumer surplus and social welfare. When consumers lack environmental consumer awareness, all firms engage in imperfect pollution abatement, and the socially optimal environmental tax is not zero. Under full environmental consumer awareness, public firm will incur losses, while private firm still make profits. At this point, all firms will engage in complete pollution abatement, and there will be no pollution spillover in the environment. The government's socially optimal environmental tax rate is zero.