反共與親日的貼合：1936-1938年德國遠東政策轉向的利益權衡

The Alignment of Anti-Communism and Pro-Japan Sentiments: The Competitive Dynamics of Germany’s Far East Policy from 1936 to 1938

希特勒掌權後，德國對遠東政策的制定並非單一決策，而是各派系圍繞現實利益進行競合的結果。國防軍重視中國贛南鎢礦和軍火市場的「軍備利益」，外交部注重保護德僑與對華商貿的「商貿利益」，而納粹黨則以對蘇聯地緣政治的「戰略利益」為重心。表面上，政策分歧主要圍繞在「反共」與「親日」的關聯性；實際上，這些分歧反映了各派系對利益的不同權衡。陶德曼與希特勒於1936年的談話顯示，雙方雖在「反共」上達成共識，但對「親日」的觀點歧異。希特勒誤以為「反共」可以化解中日矛盾，進而穩固德國在遠東的利益基礎，最終促成了德日《反共協定》的簽訂。然而該協定的政治效應超出預期，間接引發西安事變，進而動搖了中德合作關係。中日戰爭爆發後，德國內部對日本在華軍事行動是否符合「反共」立場產生分歧。為維繫各派系的共識，德國積極推動「陶德曼調停」。調停失敗後，德國認識到國民政府難以恢復對中國市場的控制，只有日本能穩定日占區的秩序，保護德國的商貿利益。為此，德國於1938年年中選擇與日本妥協，正式承認滿洲國，並召回駐華軍事顧問團。德國在華商貿利益反而成為納粹黨將「反共」與「親日」貼合的黏著劑。

After Hitler came to power, Germany’s Far East policy was not shaped by unilateral decisions but rather by competitive dynamics among various factions, each prioritizing different practical interests. The military focused on“military reorganization interests”tied to the tungsten mines in southern Jiangxi and the lucrative arms market in China; the Foreign Ministry emphasized“commercial interests,”prioritizing the protection of German nationals and trade in China; whereas the Nazi Party centered its attention on the“strategic interests”of geopolitics concerning the Soviet Union. On the surface, policy disputes revolved around the relationship between“anti-communism”and“pro-Japan”stances, but fundamentally reflected differing priorities in balancing these interests. Conversations between Oskar Trautmann (1877–1950) and Hitler in 1936 reveal that while both agreed on the former, their views diverged on pro-Japan policies. Hitler mistakenly believed that anti-communism could resolve Sino-Japanese tensions and strengthen Germany’s strategic foothold in the Far East, which led to the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact. However, the political ramifications of the pact far exceeded expectations, indirectly triggering the Xi’an Incident and destabilizing Sino-German cooperation. Following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, internal disagreements arose within Germany regarding whether Japan’s military actions in China aligned with anti-communism. To maintain consensus, Germany actively promoted the Trautmann Mediation. But after it had failed, Germany gradually recognized that the Nationalist government could not regain control over the Chinese market, with only Japan being able to stabilize the occupied territories and safeguard German trade interests. Consequently, by mid-1938, Germany chose to compromise with Japan, officially recognizing Manchukuo and recalling its military advisory mission from China. Their commercial interests in China ultimately became the adhesive that allowed the Nazi Party to align anti-communism with pro-Japan policies. This shift marginalized the pro-China faction within the Foreign Ministry, while arms shipments to China were carried out covertly. Germany’s Far East policy thus fully pivoted toward Japan.