人民作主誰敢不服？霍布斯與洛克論人民的抵抗權

Hobbes and Locke on People’s Right to Resist

本文旨在比較十七世紀政治思想家霍布斯與洛克對於「人民抵抗政府之權利」的論點，首先指出學界對這兩位思想家的政治哲學，乍看下有許多相似之處，但對於兩人在思想史上的關聯並無共識，而唯一的共識似乎在於，洛克與霍布斯的政治理論所欲證成的目的是截然相反的。本文進一步探討兩位思想家對於「當政府與人民發生衝突時，人民擁有什麼樣的反抗權利」之論述，進行深入的探討與比較，期能說明兩人在「人民抵抗政府權利」論述上的差異，並非如一般理解是「絕對的政治權威」與「無限制的人民革命權利」之對比，並進而指出兩位思想家之抵抗權論述的真正差異。

In this paper, I intend to argue that Hobbes’and Locke’s political philosophies should be considered two theories rooted in two distinctively different assumptions about human nature. I argue that one way to reveal this difference is to analyze and compare their conceptions of right to resist political authority. Specifically speaking, The discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of MacPherson’s and Strauss’interpretations of the relationship between Hobbes’and Locke’s political philosophies, I examine Hobbes’and Locke’s accounts of the right to resist political authority respectively. Then I go further to articulate the difference between their conceptions of civil disobedience by drawing on Jeremy Waldron’s insightful distinction of‘agent-relative’and‘agent-neutral’. By so doing I indicate that the Hobbesian conception of disobedience provides more insights into the disobedience caused by highly controversial issues where no one seems to have more
legitimacy than the other in the action of disobedience. On the contrary, Locke’s right to revolution might fall victim to the dilemma of deciding‘who is the innocent’. I consider in conclusion the advantages and limits of my comparison of Hobbes’and Locke’s conceptions of civil disobedience.