| 英文摘要 |
The victory of Prabowo Subianto, a former general in the New Order era, followed by the passage of the amended 2004 TNI Law in March 2025-which relaxed restrictions on active military personnel holding civilian posts-highlights the significance that civil-military relations continues to play under Indonesia’s emerging regime. While civilian control has been established since the country’s democratic transition in 1998, recent developments suggest a subtle reconfiguration of power between civilian authorities and the military, raising concerns about democratic consolidation and institutional stability. This study employs the civilian control model proposed by Kuehn and Croissant (2023) to examine Indonesia’s civil-military relations following the democratic transition during the Suharto era. In light of the contradictory signals observed during President Joko Widodo’s administration, the study focuses on this period, which offers potential for theoretical validation. The findings reveal that most dimensions, especially elite recruitment, policymaking, and internal security, have experienced varying degrees of regression or stagnation. These developments are associated with the strategic calculations of political elites, the relative weakness of civil society, the re-emergence of domestic security threats, and the military’s efforts to maintain its institutional interests. Even in the absence of overt intervention, the military’s growing influence constitutes a substantive challenge to the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. |