| 英文摘要 |
The CPC’s Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee agreed with Mao Zedong’s decision that he would not to be the candidate of the next presidential election, so that Mao Zedong could concentrate on major policy issues and the theoretical work of the party and the country. Before the official release of this information, KMT’s intelligence officers intercepted the intelligence and first published it in the newspapers, falsely claiming that the intelligence came from“insiders”. After receiving the intelligence, the KMT conducted research and judgment. Due to the tense situation after the Kinmen artillery battle and the need for KMT to bundle US aid and build internal consensus, the KMT concluded that Mao Zedong’s decision should be“due to external forces”, developed“conspiracy theory”and“power struggle theory”, and on this basis, it launched“psychological operations”including broadcasting, airdrops, external propaganda and other means in order to create internal and external conditions that are beneficial to KMT. Based on the misjudgment of the relationship between the CPC and CPSU and the internal situation of the CPC, the KMT believed that the conditions for“counterattacking on the mainland”were becoming increasingly mature, and it accelerated the formulation of the“Wuhan Plan”focusing on paratrooper airborne special operations. However, the plan ultimately failed, because the KMT’s troop was defeated and the KMT was unable to obtain strong support from the USA. The KMT’s assessment and reaction to Mao Zedong’s decision reflects the process that a piece of news was distorted to a piece of“rumor”in the background of the world’s Cold War and fierce cross-strait confrontation. It also reflected the thinking and behavioral patterns of the KMT. This model had a negative impact on the study of the CPC in Taiwan. Restoring this historical process will help us to clear up the“mist”and show the original appearance of the history of the CPC and its political process. |