| 英文摘要 |
In times of turmoil, it is not uncommon for national leaders to bolster domestic approval ratings and advance political agendas by constructing external threats. The United States (U.S.), as a global hegemon, is no exception. U.S. presidents have historically capitalized on wartime sentiment to expand executive power and influence, thereby securing congressional support for national unity and interest. This dynamic often facilitates the passage of government budgets and legislation that might otherwise encounter substantial resistance during peacetime. Prominent examples include President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II and President George W. Bush in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks—both of whom exemplified the role of the“wartime president”in American political history. In 2020, amid the domestic outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Donald J. Trump—actively seeking re-election—publicly declared himself a“wartime president”in a fight against the“invisible enemy,”in an effort to replicate this political strategy. However, his attempt ultimately failed to achieve its intended effect. This paper examines the theoretical framework and historical precedents of the American“wartime president,”with particular attention to Trump’s atypical approach. It further investigates the post-9/11 rise of unilateral foreign policy and patriotic anti-terrorism rhetoric in the U.S., alongside the growing ambiguity—and eventual intangibility—of perceived external threats. Finally, the paper explores how these shifts have influenced presidential reliance on the“power to persuade”and the evolving efficacy of the“wartime president”model. |