| 英文摘要 |
Domestic courts primarily employ two methods for interpreting international civil and commercial treaties:“autonomous interpretation”and“nationalistic interpretation”. In the ThyssenKrupp case, faced with the confrontation between the two methods, the Supreme People’s Court opted for the“autonomous interpretation”method. Article 7(1) of the CISG, born against the backdrop of the new ideological trend, is also recognized by mainstream views as an adoption of the“autonomous interpretation”method. However, the“autonomous interpretation”theoretically has four main issues, one of which has resulted in commercial parties entirely excluding the CISG’s application in practice. Moreover, recent CISG interpretation practices have seen courts referring to foreign laws to interpret the CISG, challenging the assertion that“nationalistic interpretation”is merely a revival of“lex fori doctrine”as criticized by“autonomous interpretation”advocates. This indicates that the“autonomous interpretation”method may only be used under specific circumstances, while the“nationalistic interpretation”still has room for application and may persist in the long term. Therefore, it is necessary to precisely grasp the theoretical foundations of both methods to clarify their interplay and to reconstruct treaty interpretation methods. In this regard, this paper proposes two prerequisite conditions that must be met for the application of the“autonomous interpretation”method, and identified three types of“nationalistic interpretation”in CISG practice. Furthermore, it argues that in cases where the conditions for“autonomous interpretation”are unmet, a specific type of“nationalistic interpretation”, namely“private international law interpretation”can be adopted. |