雙重制度邏輯視野下的立法形式規避研究-以經濟特區立法為中心

立法形式規避是一種發生在經濟特區立法過程中的現象，通常表現為擁有雙重立法權尤其是立法變通權的經濟特區立法機關，有意識地在經濟特區法規與地方性法規之間作出傾向性選擇，通過前者覆蓋後者的方式，力圖規避某些立法難題。立法形式規避之所以產生，根源在於經濟特區的兩種立法形式存在制度邏輯上的差異，而這種差異又會被科層制的執行、風險和效率邏輯所放大和利用，最終通過順從、折中和回避三種應對策略體現出來。立法形式規避體現出了“兩個積極性”憲法條款下的差異化縱向治理思路，但同時也容易進一步加劇不同地區間的立法不平等狀況、加重立法變通權行使中的機會主義傾向並增加法院的審判工作量。對該行為的有效應對，既需要從中央專屬立法事項的適度共享入手實現經濟特區法規的“增量控制”，也需要從現有經濟特區法規的有效清理入手實現必要的“存量減負”。

Evasion of legislative forms is a phenomenon observed in the legislative processes of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). It is typically characterized by SEZ legislative bodies, which possess dual legislative powers, particularly the authority for legislative adaptation, consciously making preferential choices between SEZ regulations and local regulations. By allowing the former to cover the latter, they aim to circumvent certain legislative challenges. The root cause of legislative form evasion lies in the institutional logic differences between the two forms of legislation permitted within SEZs. These differences are further amplified and exploited by the bureaucratic system's logic of execution, risk management, and efficiency. This results in three response strategies: compliance, compromise, and avoidance. Legislative form evasion reflects the differentiated vertical governance approach under the constitutional clause of“Two Initiatives”. However, it also risks exacerbating legislative inequalities among regions, intensifying opportunistic tendencies in the exercise of legislative adaptation powers, and increasing the workload of courts. To address this issue effectively, it is necessary to pursue two approaches: first, implement“incremental control”by moderately sharing centrally exclusive legislative matters to enhance SEZ regulations; and second, implement“stock reduction”by effectively cleaning up existing SEZ regulations to alleviate unnecessary burdens.