自然與主體：麥克道爾與丕頻

Nature and Subject: McDowell and Pippin

本文檢視麥克道爾與丕頻有關黑格爾哲學的論辯，目的在評價反映於二者不同的黑格爾詮釋中的對於規範性的不同立場。前者認為規範性事物是自然的一部分，後者堅持規範性來自於主體，亦即人類必然的心智形式。本文論證：人類必然的心智形式之主張，屬於麥克道爾要避免的那種使得思維不受外在的理性約束的理論架構，它使得許多價值判斷被視為只反映了個人的主觀偏好。基於德國觀念論的傳統，丕頻批評麥克道爾忽略了知識論的問題。然而麥克道爾有關於「自然是什麼」的存有論議題的回答，使得德國觀念論訴諸主體性為知識與道德奠基的計劃不再可信。

This paper investigates McDowell and Pippin’s debate concerning the philosophy of Hegel. Instead of judging which interpretation better fits the historical Hegel, the argument aims to evaluate the two thinkers’ideas on normativity as reflective of their respective interpretations of Hegel. McDowell maintains that the normative is part of nature, while Pippin insists normativity has its origin in the subject, or more precisely, human beings’necessary form of mindedness. It is argued in this paper that the idea of the necessary form of human mindedness is a version of the theoretical framework McDowell is eager to reject, which makes thought not subject to any rational constraint from outside. As a result of this idea, many value judgments degenerate into attitudes reflecting personal subjective preferences. Following the tradition of German idealism, Pippin criticizes McDowell for ignoring epistemological issues. In fact, McDowell’s answer to the ontological issue about what nature is deprives the project of German idealism of its plausibility, the object of which is to ground knowledge and morality.