員工薪酬、高管與員工薪酬差距與員工工作投入的非線性關係

The Non-linear Relationships among Employee Compensation, Executive-Employee Pay Gap, and Employee Work Engagement

在本研究中，透過固定效應面板門檻迴歸模型探討了員工薪酬、高管與員工薪酬差距與員工工作投入之間的非線性關係。研究結果表明，增加員工薪酬或高管與員工薪酬差距皆有助於提升員工工作投入，並且員工薪酬在效率工資（該公司所屬產業的平均員工每人工資）時有一個門檻（符合效率工資理論），然而，員工薪酬的邊際效果會在超過效率工資時降低，說明效率工資理論支持企業支付效率工資，是因為當沒支付效率工資時，每少發一單位的工資員工減少的努力就愈多。另外，研究還發現效率工資理論與競賽理論的激勵效果是互相抵換的，當公司支付效率工資時，高管與員工的薪酬差距激勵員工工作投入的邊際效果會減弱。最後，過高與過低的高管與員工的薪酬差距，皆會加強其對員工工作投入的影響，導致公司的績效更高或更低。

This research investigates the non-linear relationships among employee compensation, executive-employee pay gap, and employee work engagement through a fixed-effects panel threshold regression model. The findings reveal that increasing employee compensation or the executive-employee pay gap contributes to enhancing employee work engagement. There is also a threshold for employee compensation at the efficiency wage (average wage per employee in a company’s industry), which is consistent with the efficiency wage theory. However, the marginal effect of employee compensation diminishes when it exceeds the efficiency wage, indicating that the efficiency wage theory supports paying efficiency wages, because when such wages are not paid, each unit reduction in wages results in a greater decline in employee effort. The study further finds that the incentive effects of the efficiency wage theory and tournament theory are mutually offsetting. When a company pays efficiency wages, the marginal effect of the executive-employee wage gap for incentivizing employee work engagement weakens. Finally, excessively high or low pay gaps between executives and employees amplify their impact on employee work engagement, leading to higher or lower company performance.