製程創新的專利聯盟探討

A Study on Patent Pools with Process Innovation

在產業內授權下，我們探討授權廠商們形成的專利聯盟，對社會福利的影響。在專利聯盟的相關文獻中，有兩個重要議題：第一、授權廠商們形成的專利聯盟，是否會傷害社會福利？第二、若政府規範授權廠商們需以非專屬授權的方式形成專利聯盟，此規範是否可以確保形成專利聯盟後社會福利不會降低？
針對上述第一個議題，我們得到：第一、若授權廠商各別授權時（結合成專利聯盟前）是以單純固定權利金授權，則形成專利聯盟後社會福利是否下降，取決於授權廠商的邊際成本。第二、若授權廠商各別授權時是以單純單位權利金授權，則形成專利聯盟後社會福利是否下降，則取決於製程專利間的替代性。針對上述第二個議題，我們得到：第一、若授權廠商各別授權時是以單純固定權利金授權，則具備非專屬授權的專利聯盟無法確保形成專利聯盟後福利不會下降。第二、若授權廠商各別授權時是以單純單位權利金授權，則具備非專屬授權的專利聯盟可以確保形成專利聯盟後福利不會下降。
以上結果，不僅與既有文獻有相當大的差異，也在實務（反托拉斯法）上也有相當的政策意涵。

We evaluate how a patent pool formed by insider licensors impacts social welfare and discuss two important issues about patent pools. First, how does social welfare change when a patent pool is formed? Second, the regulator usually requires that patent owners retain the right to license their invention separately from the patent pool. Can this rule guarantee that a patent pool will not decrease social welfare?
For the initial question above, we obtain two results. First, if licensors use fixed-fee licensing to license their patents before forming a pool, then their marginal cost will decide whether social welfare increases or decreases after forming a pool. Second, if licensors use royalty licensing to license their patents before forming a pool, then the substitutes among these patents will decide whether social welfare increases or decreases after forming a pool.
For the second question above, we also obtain two results. First, if licensors use fixed-fee licensing to license their patents before forming a pool, then a patent pool requiring non-exclusive licensing cannot guarantee that social welfare will not decrease after forming a pool. Second, if licensors use royalty licensing to license their patents before forming a pool, then a patent pool requiring non-exclusive licensing can guarantee that social welfare will not decrease after forming a pool.
Our results not only sharply differ from those in the literature, but also have policy implications in practice.