| 英文摘要 |
This paper examines the relationships between China and the European countries that hold dual membership in both NATO and EU. These countries, being among the most democratic and secure in Europe, are theoretically expected to adopt consistent economic, diplomatic, and security policies toward China in line with the official positions of these two international institutions. However, in recent years, shifts in U.S. policy towards China, divisions within the EU on migration and economic issues, and security disagreements within NATO have brought China’s“divide and conquer”strategy in Europe to the forefront. Given their secure economic and security status, are there systemic factors that can explain the varying relationships between European states and China? This paper argues that the geographic distance between Europe and China, coupled with the absence of a direct security threat from China and the growing security threat posed by Russia—as well as the deepening cooperation between China and Russia- make relations with Russia a key determinant of Europe’s relations with China. On the one hand, European countries whose foreign policy interests diverge more significantly from those of Russia are likely to experience greater conflicts with China, driven by factors such as democratic and human rights values, calls from the United States, and China’s support for Russia. However, on the other hand, due to economic considerations, these countries are also expected to engage in greater cooperation with China. This seemingly paradoxical outcome suggests that European states are engaging in a standard“hedging”strategy toward China, a rational choice balancing“economic opportunities”and“security risks”. Empirical evidence from 22 European countries with dual EU and NATO membership from 2005 to 2022 supports this argument. |