| 英文摘要 |
The traditional perspective toward welfare state reforms contends that welfare states can no longer sustain generous welfare promises in the face of intense pressure for change, with austerity measures among the possible strategies to ensure sustainable operation. However, welfare cutbacks are highly unpopular policy reforms that often lead to electoral punishment and the loss of power for incumbents. Politicians can only consider welfare cutbacks when they have found strategies to mitigate the backlash. Yet despite the political risk associated with welfare cutbacks, the Tsai Ing-wen administration committed to pension reform even before taking office Secondly, from a functionalist perspective, fiscal crises are often the driving force behind reforms, but the Tsai Ing-wen administration prioritized reforming military, civil service, and teacher pensions, while the financially critical labor insurance system was not immediately a part of the political agenda. This raises the question of why the administration selectively pursued pension reform. Furthermore, pension reforms in most countries cause significant political conflicts, necessitating a low-key approach to avoid electoral punishment. In contrast, the Tsai administration attempted to use the reform as a means to solicit public votes. This unconventional approach warrants further investigation. The study demonstrates that the political strategy choices regarding pension reform under the Tsai Ing-wen administration were not made on a whim but rather were constrained by institutional legacies and voter preferences, shaping the final policy outcomes. |