| 英文摘要 |
According to the doctrine of double effect (DDE, henceforth), the intention of an action is a major factor of its moral permissibility. Consider an action producing a good effect and a bad effect, DDE holds that one must not aim at the bad effect to realize the good one. In other words, it is morally impermissible for one to aim at a bad effect, even just to good ends. DDE is attractive in many cases, but still upset by some counterexamples. Proponents of DDE propose different modifications to avoid counterexamples. Among them, one prominent account holds that it is the possible intention rather than the actual one that DDE is about. Another popular way to respond is to propose a distinction between“intend to x”and“because of x”. Both strategies seem to be successful. However, I argue that these proposals are in difficulties with a new kind of counterexample, elevated tram. Consequently, DDE is no longer satisfactory until it addresses this issue. |