| 英文摘要 |
This study adopts contract theory as an analytical framework to examine the legal nature and institutional function of“consent agreements”and“supplementary contracts”in Taiwan’s urban renewal system. The current institutional design reveals significant power asymmetries and incomplete contracts, which hinder stakeholders from effectively participating in the amendment, profit-sharing, and revocation procedures of urban renewal projects. By integrating insights from incomplete contract theory, transaction cost economics, property rights theory, principal-agent theory, and auction theory, the study further incorporates a stakeholder interaction perspective to analyze empirical cases in Taipei—such as the MVP Changhong Project, Tongchuang Yi Project, and Longquan Section Renewal Project. These cases highlight the structural flaws and contractual imbalance inherent in the consent agreement mechanism. The study particularly applies auction theory to examine how supplementary contracts can rebalance the allocation of control rights and address contractual incompleteness. It proposes the integration of a“project integrator”institution and the design of a surplus-profit auction mechanism through supplementary contracts to improve contractual fairness and incentive alignment. Ultimately, the findings offer concrete policy recommendations for legal and institutional reforms in Taiwan's urban renewal framework. |