| 英文摘要 |
This paper examines the evolution of international discourse on the“One China”through the lens of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) international front work strategy. Although China claims that its“One-China Principle”is a“universal consensus in the international society,”other countries’interpretations of the“One China”do not often align with Beijing’s stance and they may shift in response to changes in international politics. This paper analyzes how Beijing consolidates its“One-China”discourse through strategic partnership from the perspective of International United Front Work. Using text mining on 294 bilateral joint statements of China’s strategic partnerships with other countries, this research finds that, first, the term“One-China Policy”is more widely accepted by the international community than Beijing’s self-asserted“One-China Principle,”yet the frequency of“One-China Principle”has increased since 2018. Moreover, while Beijing’s has claimed its“One- China principle”consistently represent the legitimate government of China, in recent years the scope has expanded to issues including Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, not merely focusing on cross-Strait relations and the Taiwan issue. Finally, through qualitative discourse analysis of statements, this study identifies three types of China’s international united front strategy: consolidating ties with the countries of“Global South,”dividing U.S. allies, and co-opting Taiwan’s former diplomatic allies. This paper contributes to the literature by illustrating how China uses international united front strategy to frame its“One-China Principle”as a“universal consensus”with its strategic partners, and evaluating its effectiveness based on international responses. |