| 英文摘要 |
This article reconstructs and develops Norman Y. Teng’s two linkage-arguments against the Is-Ought dichotomy: the linkage between causal attribution and liability for outcomes, and that between causality and reasons. The article proposes a causal-teleological view of norms to elaborate how norms influence causal attribution and liability for consequences, then puts forward a causal-engaging view of practical deliberation to support a difference-making-based account of normative reasons. Based on the two views above, the goal-setting and the means-choice function of norms highlights the normative reasons to which an agent should respond. Finally, this article argues that when the causal relation between an action prescribed by a norm and the intended effect of the norm is invariant, the intended effect is reasonably foreseeable and can delimit the scope of consequences for which a norm-violating agent is responsible. |