公司經營權爭奪如何影響市場反應－－以台灣為例

The Impact of Corporate Control Contests on Market Reactions: Evidence from Taiwan

此研究主要檢視經營權爭奪及公司治理的特徵如何影響股東會之市場反應。實證結果發現，當企業於股東會前六個月內有經營權爭奪新聞見報時，將不利於股東會之累積異常報酬。而市場對於公司治理特徵較弱之企業，將經營權爭奪視為一種機會，即當企業有著較大的投票權偏離現金流量權的幅度及金字塔結構特徵，合併經營權爭奪消息時，投資人給予正向反應。本研究亦發現，大同條款通過後，市場對於經營權爭奪給予正向反應。最後，發生經營權爭奪之公司於股東會後面臨較差之獲利情形。

This paper explores the impact of corporate control contests and corporate governance characteristics on market reactions surrounding shareholder meetings. This study reveals that companies with news pertaining to corporate control contests within six months prior to shareholder meetings exhibit a negative correlation with cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) during these meetings. Additionally, the market views corporate control contests as an opportunity for companies with weaker corporate governance structures. Consequently, companies with a higher deviation of cash flow rights (ownership) from voting rights (control) and pyramid structures, along with news regarding control contests, show a positive association with CARs. The research also analyzes the effects of Article 173-1 of the Company Act and observes a positive market response to corporate control contests following the announcement of this act. Moreover, companies engaged in corporate control contests tend to experience reduced profitability following shareholder meetings.