| 英文摘要 |
Using a sample of announcements of capital reduction to cover accumulated deficits (CRCAD) made by the TWSE- and TPEx-listed firms during 2009−2021, this study examines how directors’and officers’liability insurance (D&O insurance) influences shareholder wealth during the period of CRCAD announcements. Our robust evidence shows that D&O insurance coverage is significantly negatively associated with CRCAD announcement-period abnormal returns. The evidence is supported by the moral hazard-related agency problem hypothesis, asserting that D&O insurance coverage limits managerial exposure to potential litigation risk and, thus, induces managerial agency conflicts related to earnings manipulation. Hence, stock market investors are likely to respond unfavorably toward the announcements of CRCAD that encourages the pursuit of managerial self-interest private benefit. Our further evidence shows that the negative relation between D&O insurance coverage and CRCAD announcement-period abnormal return is more pronounced for firms with greater information asymmetry, while is more mitigated for firms with greater external monitoring. Interestingly, we also show that the negative effect of D&O insurance coverage on CRCAD announcement-period abnormal return becomes insignificant after August 1, 2018 when the Article 172 of Company Act is amended“capital reduction decision shall not be brought up as extemporary motions”. This implies that the regulatory change bolstered corporate governance mechanisms in mitigating D&O insurance coverage-driven managerial agency conflicts. The study contributes to the existing literature on D&O insurance, CRCAD, and corporate governance by being the first to examine the relationship between D&O insurance coverage and the valuations of CRCAD. |