戰略戰術思想的延續與轉變：1939年國軍的四次反攻

The Continuity and Transformation of Military Thought: The National Revolutionary Army’s Four Counteroffensives in 1939

在國軍的歷史敘述中，整場中日戰爭皆已妥善規劃，採取以空間換取時間的策略，實行節節抵抗的持久戰；武漢會戰後的第二期抗戰中，國軍轉守為攻，以奪取最後勝利。與國軍自身敘述不同，部分論者雖肯定國軍的貢獻，但批評其戰略戰術消極被動，缺乏攻擊意志，且指出蔣中正更期待西方國家幫助他打贏戰爭，同時維持大量部隊防堵毛澤東的共軍。本文藉由1939年國軍的四次反攻，重新探討上述分歧的論述，考究國軍對攻勢的理解。四次反攻相關研究並不多見，雖然整體鋪陳中日戰爭史實的著作多少會提到，卻多未展開討論。本文首先重建四次反攻的史實；其次從政略角度探討國軍為何發動四次反攻，分析所謂「速勝論」的是非，並探討國軍情報對戰略的影響；最後從軍事思想角度解釋四次反攻的根本原因。本文試圖說明，國軍發動四次反攻，有政略考量及對戰局樂觀欲自力勝敵的因素，但最關鍵的還是軍事思想的深厚背景。從軍事思想的脈絡來看，即便沒有短期政略考量，國軍也會發動反攻，這是1939年四次反攻的根本原因。論者批評國軍不採取攻勢，其實自開戰以來，國軍一直採取攻勢防禦，到1939年達到高峰，只是中日戰力差距太大，難以落實。1939年的反攻，不是武漢會戰後的新戰法，而是先前戰略戰術的延續，此期間也是國軍軍事思想的關鍵轉變時期。

In the historical narrative of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA), the entire Second Sino-Japanese War was well planned, with the strategy of exchanging space for time and of a protracted war of resistance; and in the second phase after the Battle of Wuhan, the NRA shifted towards the offensive to achieve victory. Contrary to this account, some commentators, while acknowledging the contributions of the NRA, have criticized it for its passive strategy and lack of will to attack, arguing that Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) looked to the West for help while maintaining large numbers of troops to defend against Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) Communist forces. The present article revisits these divergent views by examining the four counteroffensives of the NRA in 1939, only mentioned in passing by previous studies, to consider their own understanding of said offensives. The relevant historical facts are first reconstructed. Secondly, this article examines why the offensives were launched from the perspective of political strategy, analyzes statements over the so-called“quick victory theory,”and explores the influence of the NRA’s intelligence on strategy. Finally, military theory is adopted to explain the fundamental reasons for the offensives. This article argues that the NRA initiated the four counteroffensives due to political strategy and optimism in the war, but the most crucial factor was military ideology; that is, even if there were no political-strategic considerations, the NRA would have continued with the campaign in 1939. Inconsistent with the received criticisms, the NRA had in fact adopted an offensive defense from the onset of the war, which reached its peak in 1939, but the gap between the Chinese and Japanese forces was too significant for it to be implemented. The counteroffensives of 1939 were not a new tactic but a continuation of previous strategies, with this period also being a critical period of change in the military ideology of the NRA.