重探天台宗荊溪湛然之「無情有性」的倫理別義

Rethinking the Alternative Ethical Significance of“Insentient Beings Possessing Buddha-Nature”in the Tiantai Philosophy of Jingxi Zhanran

「無情有性」思想是唐代天台宗荊溪湛然於《金剛錍》中所提出的重要概念，在中國佛教哲學史上形成獨特的思想。目前學界對於「無情有性」的哲學研究大多聚焦於存有論或環境倫理，並與深層生態學與綠色佛教進行學術對話。然而，本文認為僅從存有論視角探討「無情有性」的倫理思想仍有所不足，必須進一步分析其作為倫理思想之所以可能的理論基礎。本文指出，在缺乏理性認知與抉擇條件的情境下，僅依賴存有論難以支撐倫理平等的論述。若能考慮有情眾生的理性認知能力，則「無情有性」的倫理思想將更加完備，亦能更有效地回應當代倫理學與生態哲學的關切。

The concept of“insentient beings possessing Buddha-nature”is a significant doctrine articulated by Jingxi Zhanran of the Tang Dynasty’s Tiantai school in Jingangpi , which introduced a distinctive perspective within the history of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. Contemporary scholarly research on this concept primarily centers on its ontological implications and environmental ethics, frequently engaging in discourse with Deep Ecology and Green Buddhism. However, this paper contends that an exclusively ontological examination of“insentient beings possessing Buddha-nature”is inadequate for fully apprehending its ethical dimensions. A more thorough analysis of the theoretical foundation that substantiates its viability as an ethical doctrine is required. This study asserts that, in the absence of rational cognition and volitional agency, a purely ontological framework fails to sufficiently justify claims of ethical equality. By integrating the rational cognitive capacities of sentient beings, the ethical implications of“insentient beings possessing Buddha-nature”can be more rigorously articulated, thereby offering a more robust response to contemporary ethical and ecological discourses.