監督與河蟹：董事會異議對企業策略改變之績效意涵

Governance and HeXie: The Performance Implication of Board Dissent on Strategic Changes

研究目的：本研究結合代理理論與利害關係人理論，探討獨立董事監督在策略改變上的功能如何影響董事會的和諧，進而對企業的績效產生影響。
研究設計／方法：使用2010年至2021年間300家獨立董事異議和無異議公司構成的配對樣本進行迴歸分析。
研究結果：策略改變程度愈大時，獨立董事異議及異議的獨立董事離任皆能改善策略變化對企業績效的負向影響。
研究限制／啟發：獨立董事的異議雖重要但罕見。董事會的不和諧可能已存在，難以用次級資料來全面認定，未來需以不同衡量方式探究董事會不和諧的前因與影響。
理論／實務／社會意涵：在策略調整時，兼顧公司治理與董事會和諧有助於改善企業績效。
創見／價值：釐清在策略改變決策中，董事會以共識或異議方式進行對企業績效的影響。

Purpose–The study, from the agency and stakeholder views, is aimed to explore how the governance function of independent directors in strategic changes affects boardroom harmony and firm performance.
Design/methodology/approach–Empirical analysis was conducted using a match-paired sample of 300 independent director dissent, compared with no-dissent counterparts of Taiwan-listed firms during 2010 to 2021.
Findings–Among firms’subject to greater degree of strategic change, the dissent of independent directors softens the negative impact of strategic change on firm performance. The quit of the dissent independent director weakens the damage to firm performance.
Research limitations/implications–Given the disclosed dissent cases of the independent directors is limited, the lack of objective data paves the way to more fine-tuned approaches to identifying the boardroom harmony/discord and the corresponding effects on a focal firm’s strategic changes.
Practical implications/Social implications–The balance between corporate governance and board harmony can help to improve the company’s performance via strategic changes.
Originality/value–To clarify the impact of boardroom discord, in terms of director dissent or quit, on strategic changes.