從官方檔案看國民黨政府對二二八善後處理的思維（1988-1992）

Mindset of the KMT Government in Dealing with the Aftermath of the 228 Incident: Analysis Based on Official Files (1988–1992)

二二八事件在解嚴前長期是一個禁忌，一直到李登輝主政時有了轉變，本文特別關注於在李登輝繼任第七任總統，以及在第八任任內的兩年間，也就是集思會成立到1992年《二二八事件研究報告》公布後這段期間，國民黨政府在二二八事件善後處理的思維。
在本論文藉由史料的爬梳與探究中，理解國民黨政府是在被動下展開的處理二二八善後的問題，但也因這特殊的時空環境中，國民黨政府不僅要藉由政治權力派系的角力與不同政治光譜的合縱連橫，才能達到一方面凝聚朝野對二二八事件善後的共識；另一方面也才能降低國民黨內部、外部對善後處理的阻力。所以一份具有學術意義的《二二八事件研究報告》從當時官方的角度來看，既是預想；但也是一個重要的開始。

Prior to the lifting of martial law, the 228 Incident was long considered taboo. The situation changed only after Lee Teng-hui took office. In this paper, special emphasis is given to the KMT government's mindset in dealing with the aftermath of the 228 Incident, focusing on the seventh term of the presidency, when Lee Teng-hui was appointed, as well as the first 2 years of the eight term of the presidency, i.e., the period from the establishment of the Jisihui until after the 1992 release of the Research Report on the 228 Incident.
By sorting and investigating historical data, this paper concluded that the KMT government was passively compelled to approach the issue of ''dealing with the aftermath of the 228 Incident''. However, due to the unique temporal and spatial environment, the KMT government needed to broker an agreement between the ruling party and the opposition on how to deal with the aftermath of the 228 Incident, which involved a struggle between political power factions and a vertical and horizontal alliance of political spectrums. Nevertheless, this was the only way to reduce the KMT government’s internal and external resistance to negotiations. As a result, from the official perspective at the time, publishing a Research Report on the 228 Incident that held academic significance was not only expected, but also an important first step.