舉國體制與高層決策：中國「中央專門委員會」成立過程之研究（1955-1962）

Whole Nation System and Top-level Decision: Establishment of China’s“Central Special Committee”（1955-1962）

中國共產黨歷史上以舉國體制進行科研攻堅最典型的案例，莫過於1962年11月成立的中共中央專門委員會（中央專委），其召集了總理、七位副總理及相關部門首長共15人，調度全國資源共同推動核武研製，促成1964年中國原子彈試爆成功。為探究中共於經歷大躍進和中蘇交惡等內外挑戰後，毛澤東願意將科技政策全權交由他人，甚至同意成立中央專委的原因，本文從1955年毛澤東明確提出中國該發展原子彈為開端，以毛澤東與聶榮臻為主要觀察對象，檢視原子彈相關政策體制及研發生產過程中的政治關係演變及決策情形。本文認為從近因觀之，大躍進後資源調度不易、原子彈建設只差頂層協調、軍隊內部路線與利益之爭及獲得核武威懾等等因素，確實促使跨部門的特殊機構（中央專委）得以產生。但從遠因而論，參與核武研製者長年成功展現「又紅又專」特質，才是毛澤東願意以較為開放與妥協的態度面對原子彈研製政策，並同意中央專委成立的深層原因。中國中央專委成立的過程反映文革以前毛時期的極權主義其實存在彈性空間，以及派系政治的雛型。當前習近平雖然強調以「新型舉國體制」推動重大科研創新，但中央科紀委員會（中央科委）在概念和實際運作上皆缺乏毛時期中央專委的動能及跨步門的特殊作用。習近平核心圈中是否存在具備專業知識、可與科學界對話的人士相關參與者是否具備競爭的空間、特殊機構能否發揮跨部門統籌的作用，將是中央科委能達成戰略任務的重要因素。

The Central Special Committee of China Communist Party (CSC) is the most typical case of the“Whole National System”in the history of People’s Republic of China. Established in November 1962, the CSC convened 15 people, including the prime minister, seven vice prime ministers, and seven heads of relevant governmental departments, to mobilize national resources to jointly promote the development of nuclear weapons, which led to China's successful atomic bomb test explosion in 1964. To explore the reasons why Mao Zedong was willing to hand over full power over science and technology policy to others after experiencing internal and external challenges such as the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet conflict, and even agreed to establish a CSC, this article starts from 1955 when Mao Zedong proposed that China should develop an atomic bomb, take Mao and Nie Rongzhen as the main observation object, to examine the evolution of political relations and decision-making in the atomic bomb-related policy system and the R&D and production process.
This article argues that from the perspective of proximate causes, the difficulty of resource allocation after the Great Leap Forward, the lack of top-level coordination of atomic bomb construction, struggles over lines and interests within the military and the incentive of acquiring nuclear deterrence indeed prompted the creation of the inter-department organization CSC. But from a long-term perspective, those who participated in the development of nuclear weapons have successfully demonstrated the characteristics of ''red and expert'' (Loyal and Professional) for many years, which is the underlying rooted reason why Mao was willing to face the atomic bomb development policy with a more open and compromised attitude and agreed to the establishment of the Central Special Committee. The process of the CCS’s establishment reflects the flexibility of totalitarianism in the Maoist period before the Cultural Revolution and the embryonic form of factional politics. Although Xi Jinping emphasizes promoting major scientific research innovation through a ''New Whole-National System,'' the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC) lacks the momentum and special role in the concept and actual operation. Whether there are people in Xi’s inner circle who have professional knowledge and can communicate with the scientific community, the room for relevant participants to compete, and the cross-departmental coordinating role of CSTC, will be important factors for the Central Science and Technology Commission to achieve its strategic tasks.