蘇北日占區戰時體制的建構及其敵人：以徐海道時期（1938-1941）為中心

Construction of the Wartime Regime and Its Enemies in Occupied Northern Jiangsu: Focusing on the Xu-Hai dao Period (1938–1941)

本文考察日軍為鞏固蘇北占領區（以下簡稱日占區）而建立的戰時體制，探討其政策綱領、制度安排及實踐情況。文中利用徐州陸軍特務機關的機密文件，闡明日軍建立、經營占領國家（occupation state）的藍圖與手法。
占領國家的戰時體制，以維持治安、強化控制為第一要義，故日方優先推動行政及警政，通過協力政權、保甲自衛隊、愛護村、縣警備隊等制度，吸納民間力量，協助日軍建政、剿匪。日軍實施間接統治有助於減少軍事占領的運作成本。不過，以低成本間接實施高壓統治，兩者間存有內在矛盾。日占區的權力生態在「占領者指導監督、協力者執行輔助」的基礎上運作，而本論指出，即使日人建置了協力政權的框架，但日籍指導者監督「不力」，與在地協力者內部成分過於混雜，令占領國家難以在抗日陣營的挑戰下於農村扎根。此外，還有大量「兩面派」充斥於基層行政組織，在日人眼線不及之處與敵對方暗通款曲。日本占領當局與抗日陣營間政治人才素質及鬥爭意志的落差，導致蘇北日占區的政治控制網絡規模雖有擴大，控制能力卻未等比增長。

This article examines the wartime system established by the Japanese army to consolidate control of the Japanese-occupied zone in northern Jiangsu Province, and explores the policy framework, institutional arrangement, and implementation of the system. Utilizing secret documents of the Xuzhou Army Special Service Agency, this article describes the blueprint and specific methods the occupiers used to establish control over the area and manage the administration of the occupied zone. The top priority of this imposed wartime was to maintain security. The key political units, the administration and the police, focused on and encouraged the civilian armed forces to assist the Japanese army in preventing and combating bandits through the framework of the Baojia Self-Defense Corps, the Railway Village, and the County Police Forces, etc. These coordinated units both reduced the operational cost of military occupation and facilitated the expansion of the Japanese army’s control from the point line to the rural areas.
However, the low-cost indirect rule and the high-pressure rule exercised in the occupied areas presented a complex challenge to the actual implementation. The wartime regime in the Japanese-occupied areas operated on the premise of“direction and supervision by the occupiers, and implementation and assistance by the collaborators.”This study reveals that the Japanese army, while able to set up the institutional framework, faced challenges due to insufficient knowledge and manpower to effectively supervise the local collaborators. Many“two-faced factions”filled the grassroots administrative organs, further complicating the situation. The difference in the“quality”of administrators between the occupying authority and the anti-Japanese camp resulted in the expansion of the network of political control in occupied northern Jiangsu—without an equal increase in its resources and capacity.