| 英文摘要 |
This paper aims to answer three questions: whether particular institutional features of semi-presidentialism facilitate or hamstring the enactment of the president’s censure power on prime minister, how the subtypes of semi-presidentialism such as premier-presidential systems and president-parliamentary systems combined with different institutional or political features would cause different political consequences, and why certain presidents within a multi-party system can dismiss the prime minister at will. The findings are that first, there is no significant difference of the turnover rate of prime minister between premier-presidential systems and president-parliamentary systems; second, the semi-presidential systems with the investiture procedure can produce more cases on the censure of prime minister than the semi-presidential systems without the investiture procedure and when the composition of the cabinet is chosen from members of parliament, the turnover rate of prime minister is lower; third, Ukraine as a premier-presidential system with a multi-party system has witnessed the president enacted the dismissal power of the prime minister by his informal power and the president of Taiwan frequently dismissed the prime ministers even in the period of unified government. This paper suggests that the stronger the connection between the prime minister and parliament is, the more stable the cabinet is, the less likely the president is to dismiss the prime minister. |