經營團隊能力與總經理權力對審計意見購買之影響

The Impact of Management Team Ability and CEO Power on Opinion Shopping

本文分析經營團隊能力（以下簡稱能力）與總經理權力（以下簡稱權力）對該企業從事審計意見購買行為的影響。實證結果顯示，能力有助於緩解企業購買審計意見的行為，權力則提高審計意見購買現象。此外，前述能力與權力對審計意見購買的影響，主要發生於資訊不對稱較嚴重或產業競爭程度較高的企業。進一步的測試顯示，相較於低能力且低權力的子樣本，高能力且低權力（低能力且高權力）的經理人會減緩（加劇）購買審計意見的行為，而高能力且高權力的經理人則在舞弊風險較高的環境下，會加劇審計意見購買。穩健與敏感性測試進一步支持因果推論。本文從經理人特徵的觀點，觀察審計意見購買現象的影響因素，豐富審計意見購買與經理人特徵的學術研究，同時也回應了主管機關與投資人的疑慮。

This paper examines the impact of management team ability and CEO power on firms’audit opinion shopping behavior. The results show that management team ability tends to reduce opinion shopping, but CEO power has the opposite effect, exacerbating it. These relationships are particularly pronounced in firms facing greater information asymmetry or heightened industrial competition. Further analysis suggests that firms with high management ability and low CEO power are less likely to engage in opinion shopping, whereas those with low ability and high power are more prone to it. Furthermore, in an environment of higher fraud risks, a combination of high ability and high CEO power intensifies opinion shopping. Robustness and sensitivity tests further support our causal inferences. This study is the first research to examine opinion shopping from the perspective of management characteristics, enriching the understanding of audit opinion shopping and management characteristics and providing valuable insights for regulators and investors.