CEO的個人特質，是否影響商譽減損測試的相關揭露？

美國財務會計準則第142號公報取消商譽攤銷，改按公允價值進行測試認列商譽減損。本研究發現，（1）過度自信的CEO有關商譽減損測試相關揭露，無論是整體資訊、或其中有關併購活動、評估方法、可供估算公允價值三大面向的相關資訊，都相對較少；（2）具會計財務專業的CEO對以上資訊的揭露，均相對較多；本結果顯示，在解讀相關資訊時，必須考量CEO個人特質的影響，以及盈餘操縱涉入的可能性；故第142號公報是否如聲稱會改善商譽報導的品質，值得進一步探討。本研究另發現，此商譽減損相關揭露多寡與審計公費一般所呈現的正向關係，會因經理人的特質而改變。

The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 142 (SFAS 142) requires goodwill impairment tests based on fair-value estimates to replace the amortization of goodwill. This paper finds that overconfident CEOs disclose few details about goodwill impairment tests, whether it is overall information or isolated information concerning mergers and acquisitions, valuation methods, and fair value estimates. However, CEOs with an accounting or financial background disclose more details about such information. The results indicate that the strong influence of the personal characteristics of CEOs on such disclosures cannot be ignored when related academic issues are discussed or report users in practice interpret such information. In addition, whether SFAS 142 provides investors with information of better quality needs to be considered and investigated, especially the issue of whether earnings manipulation is involved. This paper also finds that the positive relation between such disclosures and audit fees varies with the characteristics and backgrounds of managers.