薪酬索回與研發支出之CEO現金薪酬保障：論薪酬委員會品質的影響

本研究旨在探討公司是否因應薪酬索回條款的採用，提供CEO現金薪酬保障，免受研發支出的盈餘減少效果所衝擊；此外並進一步探討此薪酬保障效果是否受到薪酬委員會品質的影響。本研究根據採用薪酬索回條款與未採用薪酬索回條款的美國公司進行配對與分析，研究結果發現：相較於未採用薪酬索回條款的公司，採用薪酬索回條款的公司越會保障高階經理人的現金薪酬，使其免於受到研發支出導致盈餘下降的現金薪酬調降衝擊。實證發現此薪酬保障的效果在薪酬委員會品質較高的公司較明顯，至於在低薪酬委員會品質的樣本則沒有發現此現象。本研究結果可提供給投資人、董事會成員與準則制定者去評估採取薪酬索回條款的後果，特別是薪酬委員會品質較低的樣本應加關注。額外分析顯示：下年度研發裁減越少的薪酬索回公司其當年度的研發支出薪酬保障越強。因此，採用薪酬索回條款公司對公司研發支出提供CEO現金薪酬保障，可以減少CEO事後的研發裁減行為，並且可確保薪酬索回條款應扮演的公司治理角色。

We examine whether firms shield CEO compensation from R&D expenditures in response to the potential R&D cuts induced by clawback adoption, and whether this shielding effect varies with compensation committee quality. Based on a matched sample of clawback adopters and non-adopters in the US, our result shows that adopters shield CEO compensation more from the income-decreasing effect of R&D activities than in their pre-adoption period and matched firms. The shielding effect is driven by adopters with high-quality compensation committees, with no effect observed for those with low-quality committees. Our findings should interest investors, boards of directors, and regulators in assessing the consequences of clawback adoption, particularly for firms with lowquality compensation committees. Additional analyses show that clawback adopters with fewer next year R&D cuts exhibit greater R&D shielding effects in the current year. Thus, adopters supplement clawback adoption with targeted cost shielding in CEO compensation plans, mitigating clawbackinduced R&D cuts and ensuring clawback provisions’governance role.