| 英文摘要 |
The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently has 164 members, accounting for 84.9% of the total number of member states in the United Nations, and 84.5% of the same base in the World Health Organization. In a situation where the membership overlap among these three international organizations exceeds 80%, this paper raises a question that is still relatively unexplored in the academic literature nowadays: Does the degree of trade liberalization have a negative impact on the performance of governing the COVID-19 pandemic for the WTO members (sovereign states and separate customs territories)? By assessing the quantity of‘treaty obligations’undertaken by the WTO members, this paper estimates the level of members’integration into trade liberalization. It is observed that as WTO members take on more obligations, their performance to govern the public health crises such as COVID-19 becomes worse. In other words, an excessively high degree of trade liberalization does indeed pose a disadvantage to the health security of a majority of WTO members. Another contribution of this paper lies in meaningfully and intricately categorizing trade liberalization, which illustrates that not all types of‘trade openness’will necessarily weaken the capabilities of governance and response that the WTO members have in a time of public health crises. |