英文摘要 |
This essay takes a critical look at the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra through analyzing the concepts of ‘compassion’ and ‘nonself ’. I take as my main line of inquiry Charles Goodman's argument that the bodhisattva conduct of Vimalakīrti is a type of consequentialism, aiming not only to establish the validity of his arguments against the original standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, but furthermore also using the text as a core reference to explore types of Buddhist ethics based on the two theories of ‘compassion’ and ‘non-self ’. However, despite appearing quite convincing initially, Goodman's argument is inherently flawed: having taken into account the implications of ‘non-self’, ‘non-abiding’ and ‘compassion’ during the decision procedure of the consequentialist, he however neglects the implications of ‘non-self’ and ‘non-abiding’ during the structure of evaluation of consequentialism as a whole in his appraisal of the ethical system of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, thus resulting in a conflict between the outcome of his argument and his initial definition. I argue that the core standpoint of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra is irreconcilable with a consequentialist ethical system, and further point out that since the theories of ‘non-self ’ and ‘compassion’ are based on the realization of emptiness, the core implications of the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra which relies on concepts such as ‘non-self ’, ‘compassion’, ‘non-abiding’, ‘emptiness', ‘non-duality’ and so forth can be taken as an authoritative persuasion of its distinctive ethical system under the guise of ‘neither exhaust the conditioned, nor abide in the unconditioned ’ as put forward in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra. |