| 英文摘要 |
This article is a study of the nature of “obstruction of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa)” as presented in both East Asian Vijñānavāda and with Indo-Tibetan Mādhyamika. It is my final chapter on this topic and aims at answering the following questions: (a) Is jñeyāvaraṇa is afflicted or non-afflicted? (b) If it is afflicted, in what sense is it afflicted, and how is it related to misconception (avidyā) and non-afflicted notknowing (akliṣṭa-ajñāna)? (c) How is the problem of the nature of jñeyāvaraṇa related to the distinctive missions of Hināyāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism? This study compares and contrasts the following two pairs of key concepts: first, avidyā and ajñāna and second, akliṣṭa-avidyā and akliṣṭa-ajñāna as presented in Sanskrit as well as Tibetan sources. The article is divided into two parts. Part One addresses the concept of akliṣṭa-ajñāna in the East Asian Vijñānavāda tradition. It discusses the problem of the nature of jñeyāvaraṇa by contrasting the concepts of avidyā and ajñāna found in Sectarian Buddhism, Early Yogācāra in India, and the East Asian Vijñānavāda as introduced by Xuanzang. This part includes five sections: (1) An introduction to my two-fold theory on jñeyāvaraṇa of East Asian Vijñānavāda. (2) Grammatical analysis of the terms avidyā and ajñāna. (3) A discussion of Sectarian Buddhism's two-typed classification of ajñāna. (4) A discussion of avidyā and akliṣṭa-ajñāna according to Early Yogācāra śāstras. (5) An exploration of how, the problematic nature of jñeyāvaraṇa is addressed in the Chengweishi Lun and the *Buddhabhūmi-sūtraśāstra by contrasting the concepts of avidyā and akliṣṭa-ajñāna. |