英文摘要 |
In judicial practice, Article 28 of the Civil Code has been interpreted by the standard of Article 188 of the Civil Code as“performing duties”, and it is considered that acts“in appearance”or“in connection with”are within the scope of performing duties, but the personal criminal acts of the representative are excluded, and this standard can be seen from the court's decision of the“Fraudulent Insurance Company Commissions”. However, in the Supreme Court's judgment Tai-Sheng No. 108-2035, which established a unified interpretation of corporate liability for tortious acts, the existing system of corporate responsibility will be affected. If Article 28 of the Civil Code maintains the characterization of“liability for one's own acts”of legal persons, it will not only be impossible to distinguish from Article 184 of the Civil Code, but also make the liability of legal persons for infringement of rights too much linked to the liability of natural persons for infringement of rights, which makes it difficult to determine the liability of legal persons in the recent development of society. In this paper, we believe that Article 28 of the Civil Code should be repositioned as“liability for the acts of others”in order to be consistent with the elements of liability and legal effects of the provision. Given the special nature of the representative relationship and its impact on transaction security, corporations should monitor the actions of their agents and assume third-party liability for the tortious acts of their representatives. Therefore, in determining whether an act falls within the scope of the performance of official duties under Article 28 of the Civil Code, this article suggests that consideration should be given to whether the victim had legitimate trust in the agent's actions. This approach is more in line with theoretical foundations and does not necessarily exclude personal criminal acts of the agent in the determination of the performance of official duties. |