美國甘迺迪政府對寮國內戰之認知與對策

John F. Kennedy and American Foreign Policy: Leading Bureaucrats’Perception and Response towards the Civil War in Laos

美國總統甘迺迪就任後，將國家安全會議調整為「總統量身訂製」的幕僚決策圈，由受信賴的幕僚團隊向總統提供建議。因此，本論文以官僚行為模式為研究途徑，欲檢視：（1）甘迺迪對國安會革新之動機與調整；（2）甘迺迪政府決策官僚對於「寮國內戰」之認知；（3）未達成停火協議時，軍方決策官僚對於軍事干預之歧見。本論文主張甘迺迪、國務卿魯斯克以及其他決策官僚認為寮國內戰，可透過1962年日內瓦會議的寮國中立化得到緩解，強調外交談判優先於軍事干預，挽救美國與其盟邦在印度支那的頹勢。然而，陸軍參謀長德克將軍、空軍參謀長懷特將軍以及海軍參謀長伯克上將對於在談判破局後，美國應該如何進行干預卻沒有達成共識。本研究發現，寮國的中立係大國安排下所進行，寮國內部並未達成共識，『日內瓦會議；下的寮國中立僅是甘迺迪在印度支那困境下的背水一戰。

After President John F. Kennedy took office, he restructured the National Security Council (NSC) into a“presidentially tailored'' inner circle of counselling, consisting of a trusted team of advisers providing recommendations to the President. This article adopts a bureaucratic behavior approach to examine: (1) the reform of the NSC under Kennedy; (2) the leading bureaucrats’perceptions towards the Civil War in Laos; and (3) the bureaucratic conflicts regarding military intervention for cases when a cease-fire agreement failed. This article argues that President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and other decision-makers believed that the architect of the neutral Laos at the 1962 Geneva Conference could ease tensions in the Civil War in Laos. Since the U.S. and her allies did not gain the upper hand over the spread of Communism in Indochina, they preferred diplomatic negotiations to military intervention. In addition, Army Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker, Air Force Chief of Staff General, Thomas D. White, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke failed to reach a consensus on how the U.S. should intervene following the breakdown of negotiations. This article has found that the Laos' neutral status was arranged by the great powers and this was unfortunately the result of the Civil War in Laos. The neutrality of Laos under the Geneva Conference of 1962 was seen as a last-ditch effort by Kennedy to reverse the downward trend of politics in Indochina.