韓儒韓元震對李柬以「明德」為「本然之心」的批判

Han Won-jin's Criticism of Yi Gan's“the Luminous Virtues as the Original Mind”

本文欲通過韓國十八世紀「湖洛論爭」中，韓儒李柬與韓元震在「未發氣質之性有無」之辯中的子議題：「心與氣質之辨」及其所延伸出的另一個問題：「聖凡心同／心不同」，探究在朱子理氣論中「心」是「氣」的前提下，韓元震對於李柬援引並詮釋朱子《大學章句》的「明德」注來說明其「本然之心」概念在道德實踐中的意義之批判，以此凸顯朱子學可能會面臨的倫理學困境，即（1）朱子學是否能說明「善的異質性」（the heterogeneity of the good），以及（2）朱子學是否能說明儒家的「道德普遍主義」（moral universalism）。最後筆者指出，雖然在命題的形式上，韓元震因為主張「心與氣質無辨」看似與朱子學的立場一致，李柬主張「心與氣質有辨」看似與朱子學的立場相違背，但在理論後果上，韓元震的主張將讓朱子學更加陷入「決定論」的難題。

Concerning the 18th century Korean Confucians' “Ho-Rak Debate,” “the difference of mind and physical matter” as the sub-topic of “whether there is physical nature before issuance (未發氣質之性有無)” was issued, and it derived the question “the difference of saint's and commoner's minds.” Regarding these issues, Yi Gan quoted and interpreted Zhu Xi's note of “luminous virtue (明德)” in The Commentary on The Great Learning (大學章句) to illustrate the significance of “original mind (本然之心)” in moral practice. However, it was criticized by Han Won-jin. This article, under the premise that mind is material force (氣), studies Yi-Han's debates to point out two possible moral problems of Zhu Xi's theory, which are (1) the explanation of the heterogeneity of the good, (2) the explanation of “moral universalism.”
This article also clarifies that Han's statement was in accordance with Zhu Xi's theory in the issue of “difference of mind and physical matter,” however his inclination will make Zhu Xi's theory fall into the predicament of “determinism.”