英文摘要 |
This article is intended to analyze anew the strengths and weaknesses of Zhu-Xi's doctrine in terms of the dialectical relationship between morality and knowledge. On the one hand, it is arguably true that Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming excel at grasping this correlation on the practical front; for Zhu-Xi attempts to achieve moral character by recourse to both cognitive and reflective approaches, whereas Lu and Wang insist that knowledge is unable to provide moral motivation. In particular, Wang's division between liangzhi and jianwen sheds light on the subordinately dialectical relationship between morality and knowledge. That is, empirical knowledge acts as the assistant of moral judgment in that the former offers relevant information before and after our judgment. On the other side of the coin, there exists a type of reciprocally dialectical relationship between morality and knowledge insofar as ethical knowledge plays the role of pre-structure when we are making moral judgment. Zhu-Xi is considerably aware of the influence of ethical knowledge over our handling of moral dilemmas, as well as talking about how to figure out a practice for dealing with these dilemmas. Contrary to Zu-Xi, Wang Yangming asserts that the only effective way to settle moral dilemmas is to solidify our moral conscience and sharpen our moral sense, along with absorbing necessary knowledge while we are facing a moral dilemma. In this respect, Zhu-Xi demonstrates better understanding than that of Wang Yangming. Accordingly, Zhu is justified in advising Confucianists to develop the strengths and eliminate the weaknesses of the two sides. |