論反壟斷糾紛的可仲裁性判斷及實施機制

Criterion for the Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes and Its Implementation Mechanism

反壟斷法私人執行機制和法經濟學中成本效益理論為反壟斷糾紛具備可仲裁性提供了理論基礎。在判斷反壟斷糾紛是否具備可仲裁性時，可以區分純粹國內仲裁和涉外仲裁，分別借助國內公共政策和國際公共政策確立可仲裁性的判斷標準：國內仲裁中的反壟斷糾紛的可仲裁性問題可以參照我國競爭政策和產業政策加以判斷；涉外仲裁中的反壟斷糾紛的可仲裁性問題應當參照國際公共政策並結合案件與我國的關聯程度加以判斷。在具體實施機制的建構上，反壟斷仲裁可以依託內部仲裁程序規則的完善和外部司法審查標準的確立來實現私主體糾紛解決與社會公共利益間的二元平衡。

The private enforcement mechanism of anti-monopoly law and the cost-benefit theory in law and economics provide a theoretical basis for the arbitrability of antitrust disputes. When judging whether antitrust disputes are arbitrable, foreign-related arbitration should be differentiated from domestic arbitration and the arbitrability criterion can be established based on domestic public policy and international public policy respectively. The arbitrability of antitrust disputes in domestic arbitration can be judged by referring to China's competition policy and industrial policy; the arbitrability of antitrust disputes in foreign-related arbitration should be judged with reference to international public policies and the degree of relevance between the case and China. In the construction of specific implementation mechanism, arbitration of antitrust disputes can rely on the improvement of the internal arbitration procedure rules and the establishment of the external judicial review standards to achieve the dual balance between private dispute resolution and social public interests.