英文摘要 |
With the rapid rise of China and the relative decline of Japan, the North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Six-Party Talks are the main fields for realization of China’s Northeast Asian policy. Reflections on China’s role and functions in the Nuclear Crisis and the Six-Party Talks may help answer two questions. First, is China’s Northeast Asia policy really the practice of the concept of harmonious world, or is still based on the principle of realism? Second, coordinating among parties to the talk, is Six-Party Talks the start of China’s active policy or merely an accidental result? By comparing and contrasting the role which China plays in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Six-Party Talks after 2003 and the different response making by China in the North Korean Nuclear Test in 2006 and rocket launch in 2009, what can be concluded in this paper is that China’s Northeast Asia policy is still based on the fundamental principle of classical realism; therefore, the concepts of balance of power and maintenance of status quo are the underlying guidelines hidden in their security policy toward Northeast Asia.
In a nutshell, through their performance in the Six-Party Talks, China cannot be regarded as a regional hegemony, because China’s activities in the Six-Party Talks are still mainly interest-oriented rather than hegemony-oriented, so China has no intention to provide the public goods for the purposes of managing crises. Furthermore, in the Six-party talks, China has played a role with the function of coordination, and what they can offer is to harmonize the divergent standpoints held by U.S. and North Korea in crisis. Therefore, Chinese performance in the Six-Party Talks cannot be considered as the signal that China starts to shoulder the responsibility of hegemony in a long-term, but merely an overlap of national interest and responsibility towards the international society in a short-term. |