英文摘要 |
Before the Russians and the Japanese exerted their influence on Manchuria, the elimination of mounted bandits had been a priority of Chinese local governments. Current scholarship primarily focuses on the confrontation and cooperation between Japan and bandits in Manchuria. Instead, this article emphasizes governance and contributes to the study of Manchurian history by investigating how the Japanese government understood the problem of bandits in Manchuria, and how it safeguarded Japan’s state interests by suppressing these bands of outlaws under Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese mainly relied on their experience of suffering from attacks launched by bandits during the Russo-Japanese War, their investigation work, and rights granted in the Manchuria Convention (1905) to enrich their understanding of the bandits and formulate solutions to this crisis between 1904 and 1922. The Japanese enticed those bandits who did not threaten their existence to work for them, while to cope with those bandits who jeopardized their interests, the Japanese not only mobilized their troops, but also sought help from the Chinese authorities to arrest and punish these lawbreakers, and to ask for compensation, apologies and measures to deal with the aftermath. Although the Japanese military and police carried out many searches, these operations were largely unsuccessful. Japan therefore attributed the ineffectiveness of bandit suppression campaigns to Chinese failures. From the Japanese government’s perspective, maintaining their state interests in Manchuria and expanding Japanese influence in the world by coordinating with international bodies was more vital than the safety of Japanese expatriates. Therefore, Japan did not prioritize bandit eradication unless Japan’s interests were jeopardized. Following the trend of disarmament and China’s demand for treaty repudiation, Japan therefore reduced the number of troops stationed near the railway lines in order to preserve its rights in southern Manchuria. |